This paper studies the problem of secure communication over the broadcast channel with receiver-side information under the lens of individual secrecy constraints, that is, the transmitter wants to send two independent messages to two receivers, which have, respectively, the desired message of the other receiver as side information, while keeping the eavesdropper ignorant of each message (i.e., the information leakage rate from each message to the eavesdropper is made vanishing). Building upon one-time pad, secrecy coding, and broadcasting schemes, achievable rate regions are investigated, and the capacity region for special cases of either a weak or strong eavesdropper (compared to both legitimate receivers) is characterized. Interestingly, the capacity region for the former corresponds to a line and the latter corresponds to a rectangle with missing corners; a phenomenon occurring due to the coupling between user's rates. Moreover, the individual secrecy capacity region is also fully characterized for the case where the eavesdropper's channel is deterministic. In addition to discrete memoryless setup, Gaussian scenarios are studied. For the Gaussian model, in addition to the strong and weak eavesdropper cases, the capacity region is characterized for the low and high SNR regimes when the eavesdropper's channel is stronger than one receiver but weaker than the other. Remarkably, positive secure transmission rates are always guaranteed under the individual secrecy constraint, unlike the case of the joint secrecy constraint (i.e., the information leakage rate from both messages to the eavesdropper is made vanishing). Thus, this notion of secrecy serves as an appropriate candidate for trading off secrecy level and transmission rate, making secrecy more affordable but still acceptable to the end user.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background T HE broadcast channel is a fundamental communication model that involves transmission of independent messages to different users. However, the broadcast nature makes the communication very susceptible to eavesdropping. Therefore, it is desirable to offer a reliable communication with a certain level of security guarantee, especially for ensuring sensitive information to be protected from unauthorized parties.
The problem of secure communication from an information theoretic point of view was first studied by Shannon [1] . In this work, a cipher system was introduced under the assumption that the transmitter and the intended receiver share a secret random key which is out of the eavesdropper's knowledge. For the purpose of a secure communication, the message is first encrypted into a ciphertext before being transmitted, and it is assumed that the eavesdropper has full access to the ciphertext as the intended receiver. A cipher system with perfect secrecy demands that knowing the ciphertext, however, gives no clue about the message. Such a perfect cipher system is shown to be possible via the so-called one-time pad scheme [1] (previously porposed by Vernam [2] ), provided that the secret key is sufficient to randomize the message.
Wyner [3] in his seminal paper introduced the wiretap channel, where he addressed the problem of secret message transmission from a transmitter to a legitimate receiver (without sharing keys beforehand) in the presence of an eavesdropper. It is shown that the secure communication is possible when the eavesdropper observes a degraded version of the legitimate receiver's observation. The fundamental limit of secure communication, i.e., secrecy capacity, is defined to be the maximum rate under a weak secrecy constraint, where the rate of information leaked to the eavesdropper is made vanishing. Later on, Csiszár and Körner [4] extended Wyner's work by considering a setup of transmitting secret and common message over a general broadcast channel, and provided a single-letter characterization of the secrecy capacity. Notably, the secrecy capacity results hold also under a strong secrecy constraint, where the total amount of information leaked to the eavesdropper is made vanishing, as demonstrated in [5] .
For those wiretap channels where the legitimate receiver does not have any advantage over the eavesdropper, interestingly, Maurer [6] demonstrated that it is still possible to achieve a positive secret rate if a public feedback channel is available. In parallel, Csiszár and Ahlswede [7] recognized that correlated source observations could be explored for generating secret key that could be used further for secret message transmission via one-time pad. These offer alternative solutions to achieve information theoretic secrecy, which are especially interesting in cases that the legitimate users have no advantage against the eavesdropper on the communication channels.
Inspired by these pioneering works, there has been a body of growing literature studying the problem of secret message transmission and/or secret key generation by exploring the resources available in different settings. Extensive types of resources have been taken into account in order to establish secret communications without much sacrifice, or turn the disadvantages into advantages so as to make the impossible possible or even improve the overall performance. Such resources include channel state information [8] - [12] , side information [13] , feedback [14] - [18] , correlated sources [19] - [21] or shared keys [22] - [24] , and so on. In the meantime, the channel, still serves as one of the most significant resource for secure communication. Several communication channels of particular practical interest have received intense research attention. Instances include but not limited to the broadcast channels [25] - [30] , multiple access channels [31] - [33] , two-way channel [34] , [35] , the interference channels [25] , [36] , and compound channels [37] .
B. Contributions
In this paper, we consider the problem of secure communication over the broadcast channel with receiver side information (BC-RSI). The model is different from the wiretap channel with side information due to the broadcast nature of the communication channel. That is, in this model, the transmitter wants to send two independent messages to two receivers which have, respectively, the desired message of the other receiver (already available in their possession, e.g., due to previous communications) as side information. (See Fig. 1 .) This is a simple setup of a general scenario, which consists of more than two legitimate receivers, each having a piece of partial information about the transmitted message. In the following, we summarize the main contributions of the paper:
For the general discrete memoryless BC-RSI, constructions building upon one-time pad, wiretap coding, superposition coding, and Marton's coding are proposed to investigate the fundamental limits of communication under individual secrecy constraints.
• The first construction, referred to as secret key approach, utilizes side information at receivers as secret keys of onetime pad signals. This approach is shown to be capacity achieving for a strong eavesdropper (compared to both legitimate receivers). • The secret key approach is extended with secrecy coding, where the one-time pad signal is utilized as a part of the randomization in the secrecy coding to confuse the eavesdropper. This approach is shown to be capacity achieving for a weak eavesdropper (compared to both legitimate receivers). • The proposed superposition coding can be considered as an extension of secret key approach and combined secret key and secrecy coding approach. It takes advantage of the rate splitting of one-time pad signals such that they serve for two distinct purposes: 1) as a cloud center; and 2) as a part of randomization within the satellite codewords to confuse the eavesdropper. Remarkably, it is shown to be optimal for special cases of either a strong or weak eavesdropper (compared to both legitimate receivers), and in case that the eavesdropper has a deterministic channel. • The proposed Marton's coding approach is built on the superposition coding but with one additional coding layer that employs Marton's coding. The idea is to further explore the advantage of rate splitting at the encoding phase (with introduction of jointly distributed satellite codewords which carry independent message pieces intended for each legitimate receiver); and at the decoding phase only the individual satellite codewords will be decoded. As a result, a general achievable individual secrecy rate region is established, which not only includes but further improves the region obtained by superposition coding approach. The improvement is demonstrated for the mixed case where the eavesdropper's channel is weaker than one of the legitimate receivers channels but stronger than the other. • As a by-product, two achievable joint secrecy rate regions are also obtained by the proposed superposition coding approach and Marton's coding approach, respectively; in which the former is included and potentially improved by the latter, i.e., Marton's coding approach. Numerical results are presented in order to illustrate the impact of different secrecy constraints on the respective (secrecy) capacity regions.
• A linear deterministic model is studied and the corresponding individual secrecy capacity region is fully characterized. • The Gaussian model is studied. And, in addition to strong and weak eavesdropper scenarios, the capacity region for low and high SNR regimes are characterized for the mixed case when the eavesdropper is stronger than one legitimate receiver but weaker than the other.
C. Related Work
Our model can be thought of as a broadcast phase of a relay network after a multiple access phase has taken place in which the nodes have transmitted their messages to the relay in a first phase. In the second phase, the relay broadcasts the messages to the receivers which have already their own message (as side information) and desire to receive the messages from other end users. 1 Note that the messages are secure from the eavesdropper if the communication at the multiple access phase is subject to a joint secrecy constraint, which has been studied in [30] and [31] . Remarkably, this two-way relay setting simply illustrates how the information are shared in today's networked world. To maximize the broadcasting throughput, the technique employed at the relay node is very relevant to network coding. As demonstrated in [38] , the relay node (i.e., the transmitter in our model) can broadcast the XORed messages. Then, the legitimate receivers, utilizing the side information they have, can decode their intended message. The broadcasting capacity region of BC-RSI ( Fig. 1 without an eavesdropper) is characterized in [38] . Besides the relay network, the BC-RSI model is also motivated by the cognitive radios, especially those modeled with non-intended messages being available as side information at receivers (see [39] , [40] and references therein).
In addition to the broadcasting to share information in the most efficient way, the secrecy aspect of the communication has been a growing concern. Considering the existence of an external eavesdropper in the model of BC-RSI, Wyrembelski et al. [41] proposed achievable rate regions and outer bounds subject to a joint secrecy constraint, whereby the information leakage rate from both messages to the eavesdropper is made vanishing. Differently from [41] , we focus on the problem under individual secrecy constraints that aims to minimize the information leakage rate from each message to the eavesdropper. Other relevant works include [42] - [45] . The work [42] considered transmitting common and private messages to each user for the BC with side information model in addition to transmitting a confidential message to one of the users while treating the other as an eavesdropper. The same setting without common messages was considered in [43] and the secrecy capacity was characterized. Recently, in a parallel work [44] , [45] , Mansour et al. considered discrete memoryless broadcast channels with degraded message sets and message cognition. The model in [45] , when the common messages are removed and individual secrecy constraint is imposed, reduces to the model considered in this paper. In particular, the scenarios of weak and strong eavesdroppers (as characterized in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 here) overlaps with the corresponding propositions in [45] . Our initial results on this topic are presented in [46] and [47] , and, in addition to the strong/weak eavesdropper cases, we focus on other DMC models, deterministic channels, and Gaussian scenarios for BC-RSI with individual secrecy constraints in this paper.
It is worth mentioning that our problem setting is also relevant to the problem of secure multiplex coding (SMC) that is studied in [48] and [49] . SMC is a coding technique for the wiretap channel and broadcast channel with confidential 1 We consider messages as side information in this work. A model with dummy bits transmitted and serving for secret key is out of the scope of this paper. messages. Differently from the wiretap coding, SMC aims to transmit multiple messages to the single legitimate receiver, attaining the channel capacity while keeping each message individually secret. Similar to SMC, we are interested in the individual secrecy of the messages. Nevertheless, our problem differentiates itself from SMC in the sense that there are more than one legitimate receiver in the channel model (see Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 ) and the legitimate receivers possess some message as side information. For instance, to deliver the messages (M 1 , M 2 ) individually secret from the eavesdropper, in the SMC setting, (M 1 , M 2 ) are destined to the single legitimate receiver; while in our setting as depicted in Fig. 1 , (M 1 , M 2 ) are destined to the respective legitimate receivers that possess the other message as side information.
Although the individual secrecy constraint is by definition weaker than the joint one, this notion nevertheless provides a security level that keeps each legitimate receiver away from non-negligible information leakage on its intended message, therefore acceptable to the end user. In addition, a joint secrecy constraint can be difficult or even impossible to fulfill in certain cases. For instance, when the eavesdropper has the same or a better channel observation than at least one of the legitimate receivers, imposing joint secrecy constraints result in a vanishing communication rate to the respective receiver. In this paper, we devote a particular attention to these mixed scenarios, where the eavesdropper can be stronger than one receiver but weaker than the other. In such cases, individual secrecy serves as a practical security solution that is attainable. In fact, such a weaker security constraint is shown to be preferable in large-scale networks. For instance, this notion has the same spirit as the concept of weak security as defined in [50] to guarantee that the eavesdropper is unable to get any meaningful information about the source in a multicast network scenario. In addition, a similar security criterion is considered to be sufficient for distributed storage systems. For instance, one can find its application in the design of secure cloud storage systems as proposed in [51] and [52] .
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a discrete memoryless (DM) broadcast channel given by p(y 1 , y 2 , z|x) with two legitimate receivers and one passive eavesdropper, as shown in Fig. 1 . The transmitter aims to send messages m 1 , m 2 to the legitimate receiver 1, 2, respectively. Suppose x n is the channel input to convey m 1 , m 2 in n channel uses, whilst y n 1 (at receiver 1), y n 2 (at receiver 2) and z n (at eavesdropper), are the channel outputs. Besides, m 2 (available at receiver 1) and m 1 (available at receiver 2) serve as side information that help to decode the desired message. (Unless otherwise specified, we use capital letters for random variables, the corresponding calligraphic letters for their alphabets and small cases for their realizations.)
A. Basic Definitions
By the discrete memoryless nature of the channel, we have
A (2 n R 1 , 2 n R 2 , n) secrecy code for the DM BC-RSI with an eavesdropper consists of • two message sets M 1 and M 2 , where m 1 ∈ M 1 = [1 : 2 n R 1 ] and m 2 ∈ M 2 = [1 : 2 n R 2 ]; • a (randomized) encoder that assigns a codeword x n to each message pair (m 1 , m 2 ); and • two decoders, where decoder i (at legitimate receiver i ) assigns an estimate of m i , saym i , or an error to each received sequence y n i . The messages M 1 , M 2 are assumed to be uniformly distributed over M 1 , M 2 , respectively. That is,
Associated with the (2 n R 1 , 2 n R 2 , n) secrecy code, the individual information leakage rates are defined as R L ,i = 1 n I (M i ; Z n ) for i = 1, 2; while the joint information leakage rate is defined as R L = 1 n I (M 1 , M 2 ; Z n ). Denote the average probability of decoding error at receiver i as P n e,i = Pr(M i =M i ). The rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is said to be achievable under individual secrecy, if there exists a sequence of (2 n R 1 , 2 n R 2 , n) codes such that
lim n→∞ n = 0 and lim n→∞ τ n = 0.
Note that, (4) corresponds to the individual secrecy constraints. If the coding schemes fulfill (3), (5) and
then the rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is said to be achievable under joint secrecy. Clearly, the joint secrecy constraint (6) implies the individual secrecy (4), and hence the jointly secret achievable rate pairs are by definition achievable as individually secure. Three important classes of the multi-terminal channels [53] are of special interest in the literature. They are 1) the class of degraded channels; 2) the class of less noisy channels; and
3) the class of more capable channels. Formally, Z is said to be a physically degraded version of Y, if p(y, z|x) = p(y|x) p(z|y), (7) i.e., X → Y → Z forms a Markov chain for any input random variable X. More generally, Z is said to be a stochastically degraded (or simply degraded) version of Y, if there exists a random variableỸ such thatỸ has the same conditional probability mass function as Y (given X), and X →Ỹ → Z forms a Markov chain. Furthermore, Y is said to be less noisy than Z , (or, Z is said to be more noisy than Y ), if
holds for any random variable U such that U → X → (Y, Z ) forms a Markov chain. And, Y is said to be more capable than Z , if
holds for all input distribution p(x). Note that the class of more capable channels is strictly wider than the less noisy one; and the class of less noisy channels contains the (physically/ stochastically) degraded ones. In this paper, for the BC-RSI with an external eavesdropper as shown in Fig. 1 , the following scenarios are of our special interest:
• A strong eavesdropper, where Z is less noisy than both of Y 1 and Y 2 .
but more noisy than the other.
B. Motivation for Individual Secrecy
In this subsection, we motivate the individual secrecy constraint by using the scenario of 1-to-k broadcasting as shown in Fig. 2 . The model consists of one transmitter, k legitimate receivers, and one passive eavesdropper. The transmitter aims to broadcast k information bits U k = (U 1 , U 2 , · · · , U k ) to k legitimate receivers with U i ∼ Bern(1/2); whilst each receiver i holds already one piece of information U i as side information. Suppose that U k is encoded into X n = (X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X n ) and consider that this channel input is transmitted over noiseless channels. Then, for the purpose of broadcasting, each legitimate receiver i (which holds U i and receives X n ) shall be able to recover the k − 1 information bits U k \{U i }, i.e.,
Thus, we have
Let us now consider the secrecy aspect of broadcasting by imposing the joint and individual secrecy constraints, respectively. We note that the eavesdropper also receives a perfect copy of X n . 1) For the perfect joint secrecy, we have
Recall (11) . We obtain
where the last strict inequality follows since U i ∼ Bern(1/2). Thus, equality in (12) is not possible. That is, for this example, no broadcasting scheme could fulfill the perfect joint secrecy constraint.
2) For the perfect individual secrecy, we have
Suppose there is a coding scheme that fulfills both purposes of broadcasting, i.e., (10) , and the perfect individual secrecy, i.e., (13) . Then, we have
where (a) is due to (10) and (b) is due to (13) . (14), we obtain that
So to say, the optimal encoding scheme (with respect to the overall transmission rate k/n) from U k to X n is such that H (X n ) = k − 1. Thus, to obtain the optimal rate, one shall take n = k − 1. This is feasible. In fact, there are many coding schemes that could achieve this. One of the options is to take
The decoding at each receiver i is straightforward. Since u i is available at receiver i as side information, it could first help to recover u 1 by u 1 x i−1 ⊕ u i if i > 1; and then sequentially recover u j by u j x j −1 ⊕ u 1 for j = 1, i. And, the transmission rate R i to each receiver i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, is equal to 1, since k − 1 bits are received in n = k − 1 channel uses. Noting that the capacity for a binary noiseless channel is 1 bit/channel use, we conclude that the above scheme actually achieves the individual secrecy capacity for all receivers.
The following insights immediately follow from this example:
• Joint secrecy might be impossible to achieve.
• Individual secrecy could be the highest secrecy level to offer (as shown in (11) on the equivocation at the eavesdropper). • Individual secrecy could be achieved without any rate degradation (as compared to the capacity region without any secrecy constraints)! In fact, joint secrecy could be impossible for a more general set-up as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: For the communication model as shown in Fig. 1 under the joint secrecy constraint, any positive rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ R + is infeasible if the channel to at least one of the receivers is more noisy than the channel to the eavesdropper.
Proof: Assume that receiver 2 receives Y n 2 as a more noisy version of Z n , the channel output at the eavesdropper. From the following analysis, we show that R 2 > 0 is not possible.
where (a) is due to the reliability constraint (3) and Fano's inequality (implying that H (
, and the fact that
2 is more noisy than Z n ; and (c) is due to the joint secrecy constraint (6) and by taking
This implies that R 2 ≤ λ 2 ( n , τ n ), which can be made arbitrarily small as n → ∞ according to (5) .
Nevertheless, an achievable rate region was established in [41] for the BC-RSI under joint secrecy constraint. In the following sections, we will focus on deriving the achievable individual secrecy rate regions for the BC-RSI model as shown in Fig. 1 , and the capacity region characterization for some special cases.
III. DISCRETE MEMORYLESS BC-RSI
In this section, we consider the discrete memoryless BC-RSI with an external eavesdropper ( Fig. 1 ). When none of the secrecy constraints are taken into account, this model reduces to discrete memoryless BC-RSI, for which the capacity region is given by the union of rate pairs (R 1 ,
where the union is taken among all possible input probability distributions p(x) [38, Th. 1] . Here, we focus on coding schemes that can achieve not only reliability but also (individual) secrecy for this model. In particular, we investigate to what extend this capacity region has to be modified in order to accommodate the (individual) secrecy. To this end, we utilize coding approaches including onetime pad, wiretap coding, superposition coding, and Marton's coding, which have been proposed for communication scenarios such as Shannon's cipher system, wiretap channel, and broadcast channel [54] . The key ingredient of our proposed schemes is the utilization of side information at receivers as secret keys of one-time pad signals, which further is encoded as cloud centers in broadcast coding schemes.
As detailed in this section, we observe that, in case of a strong eavesdropper, the secret key approach (i.e., coding via one-time pad by mixing the messages) is the best one can do; while, in case of a weak eavesdropper, the combined secret key and secrecy coding approach is required in order to achieve higher rates. (Here, we use the phrase secrecy coding in order to refer to the extension of wiretap coding technique to our broadcast model.) After a characterization of achievable rates and special case capacity results with these strategies, we detail a universal approach by employing superposition coding and Marton's coding to establish (general) achievable individual secrecy rate regions.
A. Secret Key Approach and the Capacity Region for BC-RSI With a Strong Eavesdropper
Consider the symmetric secret rate region where R 1 = R 2 = R, i.e., M 1 and M 2 are of the same entropy. Under these conditions, communicating the message M 1 ⊕ M 2 readily provides individual secrecy, i.e., the following rate region is achievable. Fig. 3 ). Both receivers can decode reliably by utilizing their side information to extract intended messages if
where (a) is due to the non-negativity of the conditional mutual information, i.e.,
Note that the above achievable region is limited by the capacity of the worse channel of the legitimate receivers. Nevertheless, it serves as the individual secrecy capacity region when the eavesdropper has an advantage on the channel over both legitimate receivers.
Theorem 1: If the channel to the eavesdropper is less noisy than the channels to the legitimate receivers, then the individual secrecy capacity region is given by the union of non-negative rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying
where the union is taken over p(x). Proof: The achievablity follows from the proof of Proposition 2. Here, we detail the converse.
and, continuing from the step after (a), we have
where (a) is due to the reliability constraint (3) and Fano's inequality (implying that
is by introducing a time-sharing random variable Q which is uniform over 1, 2, . . . , n; (e) is by taking X = X Q , Y 1 = Y 1,Q and the fact that Q → X → Y 1 forms a Markov chain (or following the same proof as in [38, p. 314 , the steps of using (3) and (4) to prove (5)]); ( f ) is due to the channel less noisiness that implies
is by the individual secrecy constraint (4) and by taking λ 1 ( n , τ n ) = τ n + λ 1 ( n ); (h) is due to H (M 2 ) = n R 2 by (2) and (i ) is derived by applying a proof similar to n R 1 ≤ n I (X;
The individual secrecy capacity described in Theorem 1 is depicted in Fig. 7(a) . That is, in case of a strong eavesdropper, the best transmission strategy is to send the one-time pad of the messages to both receivers, where both of them could recover its desired message with the help of side information; while the eavesdropper gets only the mixed copy, which gives no clue for each message individually.
B. Combined Secret Key and Secrecy Coding Approach and the Capacity Region for BC-RSI With a Weak Eavesdropper
Although the secret key approach is optimal in case of a strong eavesdropper, this scheme can be strictly suboptimal for other scenarios. In general, consider channel inputs p(x)
We show in this section that, asymmetric rate pairs beyond the secret key approach can be achieved if we combine secret key with a secrecy coding approach. That is, besides using the receiver side information as secret key, one can further take the advantage over the channel against the eavesdropper by employing secrecy coding approach [3] , [4] . First, we have the following proposition.
Proof:
Rate Splitting: Assume that R 2 ≤ R 1 . As illustrated in Fig. 4 , we split M 1 into two parts, i.e., M 1 = (M 1k , M 1s ) with M 1k of entropy n R 2 , the same as M 2 ; whilst M 1s of entropy n R 1s . Note that
1) Codebook Generation: Randomly generate 2 n R 1 codewords x n according to p(x). Throw them into 2 n R 1s bins [54] and index them by
2) Encoding: To send messages (m 1 , m 2 ), choose x n (m k , m 1s ) with m k = m 1k ⊕ m 2 and transmit it to the channel. The choice of the codeword x n for given (m 1 , m 2 ) is illustrated in Fig. 5 .
3) Decoding: Receiver 2 can decode m k reliably using typical set decoding if
with the knowledge of m 1 , and thus extract m 2 . Receiver 1 can decode both m k and m 1s if
and extract m 1k from the former with the knowledge of m 2 . 4) Analysis of Individual Secrecy: At the eavesdropper, we see that M 1k is secured by capsuling with M 2 as a one-time pad (thus M 2 is also secured as in Section III-A); while M 1s is secured by using secrecy coding for the classical wiretap channels under the condition that More specifically, the secrecy of M 2 follows from
And, the secrecy of M 1 is shown as follows. Since R 2 ≥ I (X; Z ), for a fixed i 1s , one can further bin the codewords x n and index them as
, as illustrated in Fig. 6 . Correspondingly, split M k = (M kr , M ks ).
We have
due to Fano's inequality and the fact that the eavesdropper can decode X n reliably by using typical set decoder, given (M ks , M 1s , Z n ); (b) is due to the codebook construction that H (X n ) = n R 1 and the fact that I (X n ; Z n ) ≤ n I (X; Z ) + nδ 2 (τ n ) (the proof follows similarly to the proof of [25, Lemma 3] 
This concludes the proof of the individual secrecy.
5) Achievable Rate Region:
Combining the non-negativity for rates, the rate relation imposed by rate splitting, i.e., (16) , sufficient conditions for a reliable transmission to both receivers, i.e., (17) and (18) , and the condition for individual secrecy, i.e., (19) , we obtain the following after eliminating R 1s :
as the achievable rate region for the case R 2 ≤ R 1 . Furthermore, one can apply a similar proof to establish the rate region for the case R 2 > R 1 . Putting them together completes the proof of the proposition. Theorem 2: If the channels to both legitimate receivers are less noisy than the channel to the eavesdropper, then the individual secrecy capacity region is given by the union of the non-negative rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying
where the union is taken over p(x).
Proof: Under the less noisiness condition, the inequality
Utilizing the scheme in Proposition 3, Region 1 in Fig. 7(b) is achievable. To show Region 2 in Fig. 7(b) is achievable, one can employ the secrecy coding [4, Th. 3] to achieve rate pairs
Then, applying time sharing with the left boundary rate pairs of Region 1, one obtains the remaining rate pairs of Region 2. A similar proof applies to establish the achievability of Region 3 in Fig. 7(b) .
The converse follows from the fact that the achievable region is equal to the intersection of upper bounds given in [38, Th. 1] , which is the capacity region of the BC-RSI without an external eavesdropper, and the upper bound given in Proposition 1, which is a partial upper bound by applying the results for wiretap channel with shared key for one receiver (while ignoring the requirement of reliable and secure communication for the other).
As shown in Fig. 7(b) , the individual secrecy capacity region for a weak eavesdropper is a rectangle with missing corners. Due to the symmetric roles of receiver 1 and receiver 2, the rate region is bounded in a symmetric manner as well. But, unlike the case of a strong eavesdropper, for which the individual secrecy capacity region is given in Fig. 7 (a), asymmetric rate pairs are possible. Note that both receivers could benefit from each other due to the possession of the message of the other as side information. On one hand, higher rate for one receiver indicates more side information for the other. As a result, there is no loss in the high rate pair region (i.e., R 1 , R 2 ≥ I (X; Z )), compared to [38, Th. 1] which gives the capacity region of the BC-RSI without any secrecy constraints. That is, individual secrecy to each legitimate receiver can be offered for free in high rate region. On the other hand, lower rate for one receiver implies less side information for the other. In this case, the side information might be insufficient to facilitate the secure communication of the other message at a high transmission rate and additional randomness might be necessary. This results in a loss in the rate region, i.e., the missing corners. Another interesting observation is that, for communication under individual secrecy constraint, one may not claim that if
is achievable for any c 1 ≤ R 1 and c 2 ≤ R 2 . This follows as the individual secrecy rates are coupled in the BC-RSI setting.
C. Superposition Coding
It is well-known that superposition coding is optimal for a degraded broadcast channel where X → Y 1 → Y 2 forms a Markov chain, wherein one can transmit a cloud center to the weak receiver and both the cloud center and satellite codewords to the strong receiver [54] . For the BC-RSI model, we consider utilizing the one-time pad signal as the cloud center and additional information on both messages being carried in the satellite codeword. This approach generalizes the aforementioned secret key approach and the combined secret key and secrecy coding approach, and thus achieves the optimality for both strong and weak eavesdropper scenarios. In the following, we first provide the corresponding achievability region and then discuss the details of the proposed scheme together with the special cases.
Theorem 3: The individual secrecy rate region for the BC-RSI with an external eavesdropper is achievable for the set of the non-negative rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) such that
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B. The coding approach we develop here utilizes cloud centers, i.e., the U n codewords, to carry a one-time pad signal constructed from parts of the messages. In particular, the message intended for receiver i is splitted into
and the one-time pad signal carried by u n (m k ) is constructed as M k = M 1k ⊕ M 2k . This cloud center is designed to be decodable at both receivers, which then extract their desired messages utilizing the corresponding side information available. In addition, the code design utilizes satellite codewords, i.e., the V n codewords, that are not only superimposed on the cloud centers but also carry additional information represented as (M sk , M 1s , M 2s , M r ). Here, M sk is an additional one-time pad signal injected into V n , and given by M sk = M 1sk ⊕ M 2sk , and M r is additional randomness. We remark that both M sk and M r serve as randomness to confuse the eavesdropper in this scheme, in order to achieve secrecy of (M 1s , M 2s ).
An interesting aspect of our superposition coding approach lies in the role of one-time pad signals. On one hand, onetime pad signal is utilized as the message of the cloud centers (i.e., M k ). On the other hand, it is also utilized as a part of randomization within the satellite codewords (i.e., M sk ). In other words, the coding scheme takes advantage of the rate splitting of one-time pad signals, in order to serve for these two distinct purposes. One may wonder, whether further rate splitting helps to improve the current region or not. For instance,
, with an additional layer in the coding scheme, say T n which carries information on M im that is secured by employing secrecy coding. Interestingly, the answer is no if still using superposition coding. For a detailed proof of this, the interested reader can refer to [55, Appendix D] . However, if combining with Marton's coding, further rate splitting may improve the achievable rate region as we demonstrate in Section III-D.
Note that if setting Y 2 = ∅, the region coincides with the secrecy capacity region of the wiretap channel [4] . By taking U = V = X, the superposition coding reduces to the secret key approach as given in Section III-A; while, by taking U = ∅ and V = X, it reduces to the combined secret key and secrecy coding as given in Section III-B. Thus, superposition coding remains optimal in the cases of either a strong or weak eavesdropper. Moreover, superposition coding is also optimal in case that the eavesdropper's channel is deterministic (in the manner that Z is a function of X), as we demonstrate in the following theorem.
Theorem 4: For the BC-RSI channel with an external eavesdropper, if the eavesdropper's channel is deterministic in the manner that Z is a function of X, then the individual secrecy capacity region is given by the convex hull of the non-negative rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying
Proof: The achievability is obtained by taking U = Z and V = X in (20) . The proof of the converse is given in Appendix C.
In particular, if Y 1 , Y 2 and Z are all functions of X, Theorem 4 simplifies to the following:
Corollary 1: If the BC-RSI channel with an external eavesdropper is deterministic in the manner that Y 1 , Y 2 and Z are deterministic functions of X, then the individual secrecy capacity region is given by the convex hull of the non-negative rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying
D. Marton's Coding
Although superposition coding demonstrates its optimality for some broadcast channels wherein one receiver is stronger than the other, it is not optimal in general. In fact, for broadcast channels, Marton's coding can outperform superposition coding by not requiring either receiver to recover both messages (for broadcast channels without any secrecy constraints) [54] . In the following, we consider achieving the individual secrecy of the BC-RSI model, by utilizing the onetime pad signal as the cloud center, further information on both messages being carried in the satellite codewords, and additional information on each messages being conveyed in individual satellite codewords. This coding scheme is built on the previous superposition coding scheme but with one more layer that employs Marton's coding. As a direct result, it generalizes the rate region established by the superposition coding. Moreover, we provide a special case under which this Marton's coding approach outperforms the aforementioned superposition approach.
Theorem 5: The individual secrecy rate region for the BC-RSI with an external eavesdropper is the set of the non-negative rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix D. The coding approach we develop here is built on the superposition coding which is discussed in the previous subsection, but with one additional coding layer that employs Marton's coding. That is, we split
0 codewords in the same way as by the superposition coding; while information on M 1sm , M 2sm are carried by the individual satellite codewords V n 1 , V n 2 , respectively, via Marton's coding. Note that the secrecy of M 1sm , M 2sm is ensured by adding randomness with the spirit of secrecy coding [3] , [4] .
As reflected in the obtained region in (23), for legitimate receiver i , part of the message, i.e., (M ik , M isk ), is secured via one-time pad; while the other part, i.e., (M iss , M ism ), is secured via secrecy coding. More specifically, for receiver 1, on one hand, (M 1k , M 1sk ) is secured via one-time pad (with key rate R 2 ) in the underneath superposition coding structure (at most I (U ; Y i ) bits in the cloud center U n and at most I (V 0 ; Z |U ) bits as randomness in the satellite codeword V n 0 ). Thus, in total at most min{R 2 
bits can be secured via one-time pad. On the other hand, M 1ss , M 1sm are secured via secrecy coding in V n 0 and V n 1 , respectively, which in total contribute
Note that if taking V 1 = V 2 = V 0 , the proposed approach reduces to the superposition coding and achieves the rate region as given in Theorem 3. For the mixed case (i.e., the eavesdropper's channel is less noisy than one legitimate receiver but more noisy than the other), by taking U = V 0 = V 2 in (23), we obtain an achievable rate region as provided in the following corollary.
Corollary 2: For the BC-RSI with an external eavesdropper, if Z is less noisy than Y 2 , then an achievable individual secrecy rate region is given by the union of non-negative rate pairs
where the union is taken over p(u) p(v 1 |u) p(x|v 1 , u) .
Recall that superposition coding is optimal in cases of either a strong or weak eavesdropper. However, in the mixed case, superposition coding is no longer optimal. For instance, consider the case where Z is strictly less noisy than Y 2 , i.e., Z ) forms a Markov chain. In order to apply superposition coding, one has to set V = U to satisfy the condition that I (V ; Y 2 |U ) ≥ I (V ; Z |U ) given in Theorem 3. As a direct consequence, the region (20) in Theorem 3 reduces to the set of the non-negative rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying
Compare the obtained region in (25) by superposition coding with the one in (24) by Marton's coding. It is easy to see that Marton's coding outperforms in the mixed case by not requiring the decoding of the corresponding individual satellite codeword at the weak receiver.
E. Joint Secrecy Rate Region for BC-RSI With an External Eavesdropper
As a by-product, achievable joint secrecy rate regions can be obtained by letting U = ∅ and R k = R sk = 0 in the superposition coding approach and Marton's coding approach proposed in the previous subsections, which validity follows directly from the secrecy proof in Appendix B for superposition coding; and the secrecy proof in Appendix D for Marton's coding, respectively. Note that the achievable joint secrecy rate region by Marton's coding, i.e., (27) , is derived with the addition of a time-sharing random variable Q.
Corollary 3: (Achievable Joint Secrecy Rate Region by Superposition Coding) For BC-RSI with an external eavesdropper, an achievable region under the joint secrecy constraint can be obtained by superposition coding as the set of the non-negative rate pairs
where V → X → (Y 1 , Y 2 , Z ) forms a Markov chain such that I (V ; Y i ) ≥ I (V ; Z ) holds for i = 1, 2.
Corollary 4: (Achievable Joint Secrecy Rate Region by Marton's Coding) For BC-RSI with an external eavesdropper, an achievable region under the joint secrecy constraint can be obtained by Marton's coding as the set of the non-negative rate pairs
Remark 1: The region by the superposition coding given in (26) coincides with the one established in [41] . Note that (26) is included in (27) , i.e., the region by Marton's coding, as a special case of (27) by taking V 1 
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS

A. Linear Deterministic BC-RSI
First we look into the linear deterministic BC-RSI with an external eavesdropper. This is motivated by the success of the linear deterministic approach [12] , [56] in approximating the (secrecy) capacity region within constant bits regardless of the received signal-to-noise ratio and its relevance particularly in the high SNR regime. In this specific model, the received signals at the legitimate receivers and the eavesdropper are given by
More specifically, X is the binary input vector of length q = max{n 1 , n 2 , n e }; D is the q × q down-shift matrix, and I q−1 is the identity matrix of size q − 1; n 1 , n 2 and n e are the integer channel gains of the channels from the transmitter to receiver 1, receiver 2, and the eavesdropper, respectively. Note that (a) as q = n 1 ≥ n 2 ≥ n e , the channel is degraded with the
Corresponding to these three cases, the pictorial representations of the linear deterministic model are shown in Fig. 8(a) , (b) and (c), respectively. In all cases, we have the following theorem according to Corollary 1.
Theorem 6: The individual secrecy capacity region of the linear deterministic broadcast channel with receiver side information is the set of all non-negative rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying
where [a] + = max{0, a}. The individual secrecy capacity region of the linear deterministic BC-RSI is depicted in Fig. 9 . We remark that the individual secrecy capacity region is • a rectangle with two missing corners in case of n 1 ≥ n 2 ≥ n e ; • a parallelogram in case of n 1 ≥ n e ≥ n 2 ; and • a line in case of n e ≥ n 1 ≥ n 2 . Compared to the capacity region of the BC-RSI (which is a rectangle defined by 0 ≤ R 1 ≤ n 1 and 0 ≤ R 2 ≤ n 2 according to [38, Th. 1]), the missing parts reflect the loss in the transmission rates due to the individual secrecy constraints. And, as the eavesdropper gets stronger, the loss increases. Nevertheless, in the worst case, positive secrecy rate pairs are still possible under the individual secrecy constraint (as shown in Fig. 9(c) ), unlike the case under the joint secrecy constraint (as demonstrated in Proposition 1). Remarkably, if there is an extra random key K of rate R K ≥ n e being shared at all legitimate terminals in advance of the communication, the individual secrecy capacity region for the linear deterministic BC-RSI with an external eavesdropper (and shared keys) will become a solid rectangle that is defined by 0 ≤ R 1 ≤ n 1 and 0 ≤ R 2 ≤ n 2 , which is the same to the capacity region of the BC-RSI (without any secrecy constraint). To achieve this region, for instance in case of n 1 ≥ n 2 ≥ n e , one can construct X by taking (1) , · · · , m 2 (R 2 )], and k = [k(1), · · · , k(R K )] are realizations of M 1 , M 2 and K , respectively; and, for
The proof of the converse is trivial.
B. Gaussian BC-RSI
In this section, we consider the Gaussian BC-RSI with an external eavesdropper, which model is shown in Fig. 10 . It is known that one can apply the discretization procedure [54] to extend the coding schemes for finite alphabet channels to their Gaussian counterpart. Using this technique, we obtain an achievable individual secrecy rate region for the Gaussian BC-RSI. Furthermore, we derive an outer bound to the secrecy capacity region. We show that, in the high SNR regime, one can approach the individual secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian BC-RSI by employing the superposition coding. This observation is consistent with the results suggested by the linear deterministic approach in Section IV-A.
Suppose X is the channel input with a power constraint P on it and the signals received by both receivers and the eavesdropper are 2 2 ) and N e ∼ N (0, σ 2 e ) are additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) independent of X. According to the noise level in the channels to both receives and the eavesdropper, the overall channel can be regarded to be stochastically degraded in different orders. For simplicity, we only consider their corresponding physically degraded instances. The reason is that the same analysis can be easily extended to the stochastically degraded cases. So the following scenarios are of our interest (without loss of generality we assume σ 1 < σ 2 ):
The individual secrecy capacity of the first two cases can be easily derived by extending the results for discrete memoryless channel model to the Gaussian scenario. For the third case, we show in the following that we can approach the individual secrecy capacity region as P σ 2 e or P σ 2 1 . Proposition 4: As σ 2 2 ≥ σ 2 e ≥ σ 2 1 , an outer bound of the individual secrecy capacity region for the Gaussian BC-RSI with an external eavesdropper is given by the set of the rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying
for some α, γ ∈ [0, 1] and C(x) = 1 2 log(1+x) is the Gaussian capacity function.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix E. Proposition 5: As σ 2 2 ≥ σ 2 e ≥ σ 2 1 , an inner bound of the individual secrecy capacity region for the Gaussian BC-RSI with an external eavesdropper is given by the set of the rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying
The region is obtained from Corollary 2 by using jointly Gaussian (U,
For the case of σ 2 2 ≥ σ 2 e ≥ σ 2 1 , the inner and outer bounds on the individual secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian BC-RSI are depicted in Fig. 11 . Note that the evaluation of the outer bound is over all α, γ ∈ [0, 1], which results in a looser bound compared to the one proposed in Proposition 4. Nevertheless, the gap between the inner and outer bound becomes negligible as P → ∞. Thus, the corresponding individual secrecy capacity region for the case of σ 2 2 ≥ σ 2 e ≥ σ 2 1 at high SNR is (close to) a parallelogram, which coincides with the observation in the linear deterministic model.
In summary, we characterize the individual secrecy capacity region for the Gaussian BC-RSI as follows.
Theorem 7: The individual secrecy capacity region for the Gaussian BC-RSI with an external eavesdropper is given by the following set of (R 1 , R 2 ): 2 1 , and, P σ 2 e or P σ 2 1 :
Proof: For the cases of σ 2 e ≥ σ 2 2 ≥ σ 2 1 and σ 2 2 ≥ σ 2 1 ≥ σ 2 e , the corresponding individual secrecy capacity regions follow from Theorem 2 and Theorem 1, respectively. The evaluation of the respective regions is by the fact that the Gaussian input is optimal in achieving the channel capacity of a Gaussian channel [54] and the secrecy capacity of a Gaussian wiretap channel [57] . For the mixed case of σ 2 2 ≥ σ 2 e ≥ σ 2 1 , we consider the gap between the inner and outer bounds derived in Proposition 5 and Proposition 4, respectively. According to Proposition 4, each point in the outer bound is enclosed by a choice of α, γ . Taking the same choice of α, γ in the inner bound in Proposition 4 will result in an upper bound on the gap between the inner and the outer bound. This upper bound on the gap occurs only in R 1 , which is given by
as P σ 2 e or P σ 2 1 , regardless of the values of α, γ .
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we studied the problem of secure communication over BC-RSI under the individual secrecy constraints. Utilizing one-time pad, secrecy coding, superposition coding, and Marton's coding approaches, we derived achievable rate regions for the discrete memoryless model. Together with converse arguments, these techniques allow us to characterize the individual secrecy capacity region for some specific scenarios which include 1) the case of a strong eavesdropper; 2) the case of a weak eavesdropper; and 3) the case that the eavesdropper's channel is deterministic. Our results exhibit the coupling between the communication rates. In particular, we observe that one can not arbitrarily decrease one user's rate without sacrificing the rate of the other. Moreover, we studied the corresponding Gaussian scenario, where, in addition to the capacity regions for strong and weak eavesdropper cases, we established the individual secrecy capacity region at the low and high SNR regimes for the mixed case (where the eavesdropper channel is less noisy than one legitimate receiver but more noisy than the other).
We here point out some avenues for further research. First, the characterization of the individual secrecy capacity region for the general case remains as an open problem. In particular, the characterization of the capacity region for the mixed case has resisted our best efforts thus far. Remarkably, this mixed case is distinctive for the study on secure communication via broadcast channels (with RSI or without RSI) since in this case, positive rate pairs are attainable under the individual secrecy constraint but impossible under the joint secrecy constraint. We believe that our results will initiate the study of individual secrecy for other multi-terminal models. During the preparation of this manuscript, we have noticed that the parallel work [45] has considered the extension of BC-RSI model to include common messages. Yet, in a recent work [58] , we have considered broadcast channels with individual secrecy constraints. Studying other channel models under the lens of individual secrecy and comparing this notion to other secrecy constraints will be of interest.
In this paper we use the weak secrecy metric for both the individual and joint secrecy, i.e., a vanishing information leakage rate to the eavesdropper: 1 n I (M; Z n ) → 0 as n → ∞. The weakness of this metric from a cryptographic standpoint is highlighted in [5] and [59] , which have instead advocated using the information leaked, i.e., I (M; Z n ) = D(P M Z n ||P M P Z n ), as a stronger secrecy measure. Other alternatives to this strong secrecy criterion include but are not limited to the metric based on the variational distance: V (P M Z n , P M P Z n ) and the effective secrecy measured by the unnormalized informational divergence D(P M Z n ||P M Q Z n ) (where Q Z n is the distribution that the eavesdropper expects to observe when the source is not communicating useful messages). As discussed in [60] - [62] , we have D(P M Z n ||P M Q Z n ) I (M; Z n ) V (P M Z n , P M P Z n ) 1 n I (M; Z n ), where a n b n means that the secrecy metric by a n is stronger than the one by b n (i.e., a n → 0 implies b n → 0 as n → ∞).
The analysis of secure communication under these more stringent secrecy metrics have been extensively performed for the wiretap channel [5] , [59] , [61] - [63] and the broadcast channel with confidential messages [49] , [60] , [62] , with different methods such as graph-coloring techniques [59] , privacy amplification [5] , and channel resolvability [49] , [60] - [63] . Note that the strong secrecy metric by V (P M Z n , P M P Z n ) is studied in [60] and [63] ; by I (M; Z n ) in [5] , [49] , [59] , and [63] and by D(P M Z n ||P M Q Z n ) in [61] and [62] , respectively. Interestingly, for stationary memoryless wiretap channels and broadcast channel with confidential messages, strengthening the secrecy requirement does not reduce the secrecy capacity. In particular, [59] shows that the leaked information to the eavesdropper I (M; Z n ) exhibits an exponential behavior with the block length n. Moreover, similar to the Gallager's error exponent to evaluate the reliability [64] , a secrecy exponent (i.e., lower bound on − 1 n log I (M; Z n )), is first given explicitly by Hayashi [63] , which is further improved in [65] . For the stronger secrecy metric D(P M Z n ||P M Q Z n ), the corresponding secrecy exponent function is analyzed in [61] together with the reliability exponent function.
We believe these fruitful results on strong secrecy over the wiretap channel will lay the foundation stones for the strong secrecy analysis in a multiuser setting and its other extensions. For instance, Hayashi [49] establishes the strong secrecy capacity region (measured by I (M; Z n )) of the secure multiplex coding problem with common messages (i.e., one common message is destined to both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, and multiple secret messages are destined to the legitimate receiver while keeping certain prespecified collections of messages individually secret). To this end, superposition coding is employed therein. Straightforwardly, a similar analysis can be applied to our superposition coding scheme for the BC-RSI with an external eavesdropper (especially for evaluating I (M 1s , M 2s ; Z n |M k ) in the secrecy analysis, i.e., the strong secrecy of (M 1s , M 2s )). More specifically, one can take m k as the common message, and m 1s , m sk , r, m 2s as the multiple messages in which only (m 1s , m 2s ) need to be kept secret (See Fig. 12 ). Following [49, Th. 20, eq. (58) ], the rate constraint for the strong secrecy of (m 1s , m 2s ) can be derived, which is the same as (36) . Together with other rate constraints imposed by reliability analysis and rate splitting, the derived strong secrecy rate region coincides with the one subject to the weak secrecy, i.e., (20) in Theorem 3. As a direct consequence, for cases where superposition coding is optimal in establishing the individual (weak) secrecy capacity region (e.g.: Theorem 1, Theorem 2 and Theorem 4), strengthening the secrecy criteria from weak to strong does not reduce the achievable rate region. Similarly, we can show that the joint (weak) secrecy rate region by superposition coding as we establish in Corollary 11, is also achievable under the strong secrecy (measured by I (M; Z n )).
Without doubt, a proper choice of the encoding scheme is crucial for the strong secrecy analysis, since it determines the joint distribution P M Z n and the induced P M , P Z n for the evaluation. Typically, a channel-resolvability-based code construction is preferred [49] , [60] - [63] , which associates to each message a subcode that operates just above the resolvability of the eavesdropper's channel. In this way, all messages induce almost the same distribution for the eavesdropper's observations, attaining a kind of statistical indistinguishability (and thus strong secrecy). For the wiretap channel and broadcast channel with confidential messages, random coding that adheres to a structure of superposition coding is shown sufficient to attain the strong secrecy capacity region [49] . However, in the multiuser settings, for instance broadcast channels with two or more legitimate receivers, the optimality of superposition coding is in question even for situations without secrecy constraint. Therefore, one further direction is to conduct strong secrecy analysis for encoding schemes beyond the superposition coding. Such an attempt is made in a recent work [66] for cooperative broadcast channels with one confidential message. More specifically, [66] considers a state-dependent channel over which an encoder (with noncausal access to the i.i.d. state sequence (U n , V n 2 )) transmits a codeword V n 1 . The encoder superimposes its codebook on U n and uses the likelihood encoder with respect to V n 2 (so that (V n 1 , V n 2 ) are jointly typical with high probability). It is referred as the resolvability-based Marton code but different from the Marton coding in the way of choosing the joint typical codewords (V n 1 , V n 2 ). We believe that this new coding mechanism (with a likelihood encoder) will shed lights on strong secrecy analysis over multi-terminal channels.
APPENDIX A UPPER BOUND ON THE INDIVIDUAL SECRECY RATE
An upper bound on the individual secrecy rate follows directly from the results for wiretap channel with shared key [24] as provided below.
Lemma 1: For any R 2 in the achievable region, R 1 is upper bounded as
In particular, if the channel to the legitimate receiver 1 is less noisy than the channel to the eavesdropper, then for any R 2 in the achievable region, R 1 is upper bounded by
Similar results hold for interchanging 1 and 2 above. Proof: The proof follows by the result given for the wiretap channel with shared key [24, Th. 1] . Note that the same analysis therein in the remark on [24, Th. 1] for the degraded case can be extended to the less noisy case. As the rate for M 2 is R 2 , then the secrecy rate for receiver 1 can be upper bounded by the wiretap channel with shared key of rate R 2 .
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 3
A. Rate Splitting
As illustrated in Fig. 12(a) , we split
, with both M 1k and M 2k of entropy n R k , both M 1sk and M 2sk of entropy n R sk , M 1s of entropy n R 1s and M 2s of entropy n R 2s . Thus, we have
B. Codebook Generation
Fix p(u), p(v|u). First, randomly generate 2 n R k i.i.d. sequences u n (k), k ∈ [1 : 2 n R k ], according to p(u). Secondly, for each u n (k), according to p(v|u), randomly generate i.i.d.
C. Encoding
To send messages (m 1 , m 2 ), choose u n (m k ), where m k m 1k ⊕ m 2k . Given u n (m k ), randomly choose r ∈ [1 : 2 n R r ] and find v n (m k , m sk , m 1s , m 2s , r ), where m sk m 1sk ⊕ m 2sk . The choice of u n , v n for given (m 1 , m 2 ) is illustrated in Fig. 12(b) . Generate x n according to p(x|v), and transmit it to the channel.
D. Decoding
Receiver 1, upon receiving y n 1 and with knowledge of
is jointly typical for somer . Receiver 2, upon receiving y n 2 and with knowledge of m 1 , decodesm 2 = (m 1k ⊕m k , m 1sk ⊕m sk ,m 2s ), if (m k ,m sk , m 1s ,m 2s ) is the unique quadruple such that (u n (m k ), v n (m k ,m sk , m 1s ,m 2s ,r ), y n 2 ) is jointly typical for somer .
E. Analysis of the Error Probability of Decoding
Assume that (M 1 , M 2 ) = (m 1 , m 2 ) with m 1 = (m 1k , m 1sk , m 1s ), m 2 = (m 2k , m 2sk , m 2s ) is sent. Or, more specifically, (m k , m sk , m 1s , m 2s ) is sent, where m k m 1k ⊕ m 2k and m sk = m 1sk ⊕ m 2sk . At receiver 1, i.e., for P e,1 , a decoding error happens if receiver 1's estimate is u n (m k ), v n (m k ,m sk ,m 1s , m 2s ,r ) with (m k ,m sk ,m 1s ) = (m k , m sk , m 1s ). In more details, the error event can be partitioned into the followings: 1) Error event corresponds tom k = m k . Note that this event occurs with arbitrarily small probability if
2) Error event corresponds tom k = m k , but (m 1s ,m sk ) = (m 1s , m sk ) Note that this event occurs with arbitrarily small probability if
A similar analysis can be done at the receiver 2, from which the decoding error probability P e,2 can be made arbitrarily small if
F. Analysis of Individual Secrecy
Due to the symmetric roles of receiver 1 and receiver 2, we only provide the secrecy analysis of one message (e.g., M 1 ). The analysis for the other (e.g., the secrecy of M 2 ) follows similarly. For the secrecy of M 1 , we have
where (a) is due to the fact that I (M 1k ; Z n ) = 0 by
To complete the proof that I ( 
since the eavesdropper can decode V n reliably by using typical set decoding given (U n , M 1s , M 2s , Z n ); and ( f ) holds by taking
and δ(τ n ) = δ 1 (τ n ) + δ 2 (τ n ) + 2τ n . 
G. Achievable Rate Region
The resulting region has the following constraints: the non-negativity for rates, i.e., R k , R sk , R 1s , R 2s , R r ≥ 0; the rate relations imposed by rate splitting, i.e., (29) and (30); the conditions for a reliable communication to both legitimate receivers, i.e., (31) , (32) , (33) and (34) ; and the conditions for individual secrecy, i.e., (35) and (36) . Eliminating R r , R k , R sk , R 1s , R 2s by applying Fourier-Motzkin procedure [54] , we obtain the desired rate region as given in Theorem 3.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF CONVERSE FOR THEOREM 4
Consider a BC-RSI with an external eavesdropper, where the eavesdropper's channel is deterministic. That is, Z is a function of X. For a reliable communication under the individual secrecy constraint, we have
is due to reliability constraint (3) and Fano's inequality (implying that H (M 1 |M 2 , Y n 1 ) ≤ nλ 1 ( n ) if taking λ 1 ( n ) = 1/n + n R 1 ). On one hand, we have
is by introducing a time-sharing random variable Q which is uniform over 1, 2 · · · , n and by taking
On the other hand, we have
The first term R s 1 can be bounded as follows:
is by the same argument as for the step (c) and additionally taking Z = Z Q . And, the second term R k 1 can be bounded by n R k
where ( f ) is due to the individual secrecy constraint (4), i.e., I (M 1 ; Z n ) ≤ nτ n . As a conclusion of above discussions, as n → ∞ such that τ n , λ 1 ( n ), → 0 (according to (5)), we have
A similar proof can be applied to R 2 and thus completes the proof of the converse for Theorem 4.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 5 H. Rate Splitting
As illustrated in Fig. 13 , we represent M 1 , 
I. Codebook Generation
Fix p(u), p(v 0 |u), p(v 1 , v 2 |v 0 ) and p(x|v 1 , v 2 ). First, randomly generate 2 n R k i.i.d. sequences u n (m k ), m k ∈ [1 : 2 n R k ], according to p(u). For each u n (m k ),
J. Encoding
To send messages (m 1 , m 2 ), choose u n (m k ), where m k m 1k ⊕ m 2k . Given u n (m k ), randomly choose r ∈ [1 : 2 n R r ] and find v n 0 (u n , m 1ss , m 2ss , m sk , r ), where m sk m 1sk ⊕ m 2sk . Given v n 0 (m k , m 1ss , m 2ss , m sk , r ), randomly choose (r 1 , r 2 ) ∈ [1 : 2 n R 1r ] × [1 : 2 n R 2r ], and pick (c 1 , c 2 ) such that v n 1 (m k , m 1ss , m 2ss , m sk , r, m 1sm , r 1 , c 1 ) and v n 2 (m k , m 1ss , m 2ss , m sk , r, m 2sm , r 2 , c 2 ) are jointly typical. (If there is more than one such jointly typical pair, choose one of them uniformly at random. This is possible with high probability, if
(refer to [67] for the proof). Finally, for the chosen jointly typical pair (v n 1 , v n 2 ), generate a codeword x n at random according to p(x|v 1 , v 2 ) and transmit it. The choice of u n , v n 0 , v n 1 , v n 2 for given (m 1 , m 2 ) is illustrated in Fig. 14. 
K. Decoding
Receiver 1, upon receiving y n 1 , finds a unique v n 1 (m k ,m 1ss , m 2ss ,m sk ,r ,m 1sm ,r 1 ,ĉ 1 ) such that (v n 1 , y n 1 ) is jointly typical. And, receiver 2, upon receiving y n 2 , finds a unique v n 2 (m k , m 1ss ,m 2ss ,m sk ,r , m 1sm ,r 2 ,c 2 ) such that (v n 2 , y n 2 ) is jointly typical.
L. Analysis of Error Probability of Decoding
Assume that (M 1 , with (m k ,m 1ss ,m sk ,r ,m 1sm ,r 1 ,ĉ 1 ) = (m k , m 1ss , m sk , r, m 1sm , r 1 , c 1 ). In more details, the error event can be partitioned into the followings: 1) Error event corresponds tom k = m k . Note that this event occurs with arbitrarily small probability if
2) Error event corresponds tom k = m k , but (m 1ss ,m sk ,r ) = (m 1ss , m sk , r ) Note that this event occurs with arbitrarily small probability if
3) Error event corresponds to (m k ,m 1ss ,m sk ,r ) = (m k , m 1ss , m sk , r ) but (m 1sm ,r 1 ,ĉ 1 ) = (m 1sm , r 1 , c 1 ). Note that this event occurs with arbitrarily small probability if
M. Analysis of Individual Secrecy
For the individual secrecy of M 1 , we have
where (a) is due to the fact that I (M 1k , M 1sk ; Z n ) = 0 since
where the first equality is by the Markov chain
where the equality follows by: 
So far, we obtain
Finally, for the last term in (48), i.e., H (V n 0 |U n , M ss , Z n ), following from [68, Lemma 1], we have
if taking
Combining (49), (50) and (53) in (48), we have
where ( f ) follows from the fact that I (V n 0 , V n 1 , V 2 ; Z n |U n ) ≤ n I (V 0 , V 1 , V 2 ; Z |U ) + nδ 2 (τ n ) (the proof follows similarly to the proof of [25, Lemma 3]), and taking δ(τ n ) = 3δ 1 (τ n ) + δ 2 (τ n ); and (g) follows by the rate choice
N. Achievable Rate Region
The resulting region has the following constraints: the non-negativity for rates; the rate relations imposed by rate splitting, i.e., (37) and (38) ; the conditions for a reliable communication to both legitimate receivers, i.e., (39) , (40) , (41) , (42) , (43) , (44) and (45) ; and the conditions for individual secrecy, i.e., (51), (52), (54) and (55) . Eliminating R 1ss , R 2ss , R 1sm , R 2sm , R r , R k , R sk , R 1r , R 2r , R 1c , R 2c by applying Fourier-Motzkin procedure [54] , we obtain the region of (R 1 , R 2 ) as given in (23) in Theorem 5. Note that the Fourier-Motzkin procedure can be simply done by using FME-IT software for MATLAB [69] . Or, one can refer to [55, Appendix G] for a sketch of this Fourier-Motzkin procedure.
APPENDIX E PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Typically, we use the conditional entropy power inequality (EPI) [54] in the proof of the outer bound given in Proposition 4. Some steps may follow closely the steps of the proof of [38, Th. 4] .
We observe that n 2 log 2πeσ 2 e = h(Z n |X n ) = h(Z n |M 1 , M 2 , X n )
where (a) is due to the fact that for a random variable with a fixed variance, Gaussian distribution maximizes the entropy. Therefore, there must exist α, γ ∈ [0, 1], such that h(Z n |M 2 ) = n 2 log 2πe(α P + σ 2 e ),
h(Z n |M 1 , M 2 ) = n 2 log 2πe(γ α P + σ 2 e ).
In particular, we have
where (b) is due to the individual secrecy constraint (4) . Similarly, we have
≤ n 2 log 2πe(P + σ 2 2 ).
There must exist a β ∈ [0, 1] such that h(Y n 2 |M 1 , M 2 ) = n 2 log 2πe(β P + σ 2 2 ).
Therefore,
where (c) is due to the reliability constraint (3) and Fano's inequality (and taking λ 2 ( n ) = 1/n + n R 2 ); and (d) is due to (59) . Recall the Markov chain (M 1 , M 2 ) → X n → Y n 1 → Z n → Y n 2 . Applying the conditional EPI, we obtain h(Y n 2 |M 1 , M 2 ) ≥ n 2 log 2 2 n h(Z n |M 1 ,M 2 ) + 2πe(σ 2 2 − σ 2 e ) .
Using (59) here, we obtain h(Z n |M 1 , M 2 ) ≤ n 2 log 2πe(β P + σ 2 e ).
Comparing to (57) which gives that h(Z n |M 1 , M 2 ) = Letting n → 0, then τ n , λ 2 ( n ) → 0 (according to (5) ). We obtain
Now we proceed to bound R 1 . First we show R 1 ≥ R 2 as follows.
where (e) follows by the fact that I (M 1 ; Z n |M 2 , Y n 1 ) = 0, which is implied by I (M 1 , M 2 ; Z n |Y n 1 ) = 0 due to the channel degradedness; ( f ) is due to the individual secrecy constraint (4); and (g) is due to the channel degradedness, i.e., (M 1 , M 2 ) → X n → Y n 1 → Z n → Y n 2 ; (h) is due to the reliability constraint (3) and Fano's inequality (and taking λ 2 ( n , τ n ) = 1/n + n R 2 + τ n ).
Finally, Letting n → 0, then λ 2 ( n , τ n ) → 0 (according to (5) ). We obtain
On the other hand, we have n R 1 = H (M 1 ) = H (M 1 |M 2 ) (i) ≤ I (M 1 ; Y n 1 |M 2 ) + nλ 1 ( n ) = I (M 1 ; Y n 1 , Z n |M 2 ) − I (M 1 ; Z n |M 2 , Y n 1 ) + nλ 1 ( n ) ( j ) = I (M 1 ; Z n |M 2 ) + I (M 1 ; Y n 1 |M 2 , Z n ) + nλ 1 ( n ) = h(Z n |M 2 ) − h(Z n |M 1 , M 2 )
where (i ) is due to the reliability constraint (3) and Fano's inequality (and taking λ 1 ( n ) = 1/n + n R 1 ); and ( j ) follows the same argument as for the step (e). Note that
where (k) follows by the fact that h(Z n |M 2 , Y n 1 ) = h(Z n |Y n 1 ) and (l) is by the fact that h(Z n |X n , Y n 1 ) = h(Z n |Y n 1 ) due to the Markov chain (M 1 , M 2 ) → X n → Y n 1 → Z n . Recall the Markov chain (M 1 , M 2 ) → X n → Y n 1 → Z n → Y n 2 . We apply the conditional EPI and obtain h(Z n |M 2 ) ≥ n 2 log 2 n 2 h(Y n 1 |M 2 ) + 2πe(σ 2 e − σ 2 1 ) .
In addition to (56) which gives that h(Z n |M 2 ) = n 2 log 2πe(α P + σ 2 e ), we have h(Y n 1 |M 2 ) ≤ n 2 log 2πe(α P + σ 2 1 ).
Combining (63) and (64), we have
where (m) is due to the fact that I (M 2 ; Z n |M 1 ) ≤ H (M 2 ) = n R 2 ; and (n) is due to (58) and (65) . Finally, letting n → 0, then τ n → 0 (according to (5) ). We obtain
Combining (61), (62) , and (66) establishes the outer bound given in Proposition 4.
